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OVERCOMING THE POLITICS OF REFORM: THE STORY
OF THE CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
Eric Lemont*
Abstract: A pressing international challenge is developing processes of
constitution-making that manage the politics of reform and produce legitimate
and effective constitutions. This challenge is of special concern for numerous
American Indian nations that have been embroiled in dual governments and
constitutional crises over the past several decades. This article traces the
recent constitutional reform process of the second largest Indian nation in the
United States, the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma. During the middle of its own
constitutional crisis in 1999, the Nation formed an independent constitution
commission and held a nine-day constitutional convention. The inclusiveness
and independence of these two institutions - combined with innovative
strategies for achieving maximum citizen education and participation in the
reform process - provide a model for other nations interested in pursuing
constitutional reform. In addition, Convention debates over the boundaries of
citizenship, patterns of political representation and methods for achieving
separation ofpowers reflect the substantive challenges faced by Indian nations
as they have diversified and assumed greater governmental responsibilities over
the past several decades.
On a cold night in February 1999, seventy-nine citizens of the Cherokee
Nation of Oklahoma (the Nation) gathered in the auditorium of a local
university for the first day of the Nation's Constitutional Convention. The
gathering was historic not only because it was the Nation's third Constitutional
Convention and first since 1839. More importantly, it was taking place during
the tail end of a constitutional crisis that had ripped the Nation in two. For two
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years, the Nation had suffered through a series of events leading to the existence
of dual governments, complete with two courts and two police forces. A split
Tribal Council had stopped conducting regular business for almost a year.
Skirmishes between sides loyal and opposed to the Principal Chief had led to
violence and arrests at the Nation's courthouse. For a period of time, the
incumbent administration had fired the editor of the Nation's newspaper. The
New York Times and the Washington Post had reported on the crisis, the FBI
had begun an investigation of the Principal Chief and three Oklahoma
lawmakers had called for additional federal investigations.' In the middle of
everything, the warring sides somehow had agreed to a process bringing
together seventy-nine delegates to review the Nation's constitution. As the
delegates sized each other up on the Convention's first night, feelings "ranged
from mutual respect and admiration to loathing and even outright fear."2
Exploring how the Nation moved from crisis to convention to a proposed new
constitution provides an important window into many questions faced by the
large number of American Indian nations engaged in constitutional reform.
Stories of intratribal conflicts, dual governments, and constitutional crises have
been well documented in Indian Country.3 This government instability has often
been attributed to outdated, Western-introduced, tribal constitutions -
documents that to varying extents lack both legitimacy within tribal
communities as well as the institutional foundations necessary for the effective
exercise of government action.4 A host of tribal leaders and scholars have called
for American Indian nations to revise their constitutions and government
institutions as an essential first step in strengthening government stability,
1. See Anne Farris, Controversy over Tribal Funds Splits Cherokee Nation into Warring
Camps; BIA Called In for Law Enforcement Duty After Marshals Fired, WASH. POST, July 5,
1997, at A6; Sam Howe Verhovek, Cherokees Reopen Courthouse in Step to Resolve Tribal
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1997, at A24.
2. Martha Berry, Delegate to 1999 Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma Constitution
Convention, Address at John F. Kennedy School of Government Symposium on American
Indian Constitutional and Governmental Reform (Apr. 2, 2001) (transcript on file with author).
3. For examples, see Sean Paige, Rewriting Tribal Law, INSIGHT MAG., May 29, 2000, at
10; Jeff Hinkle, Constitutional Crisis: Can Tribal Governments Take the Heat?, AM. INDIAN
REP., May 2000, at 12; Ian Wilson Record, Broken Government: Constitutional Inadequacy
Spawns Conflict at San Carlos, NATIVE AM., Spring 1999, at 10-16; Robert B. Porter,
Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Government Reform: What Are the Issues?, 7 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 72 (1997).
4. See Duane Champagne, Remaking Tribal Constitutions: Meeting the Challenges of
Tradition, Colonialism, and Globalization, in VALUABLE REFORMS: FIRSTHAND AccOUNTS OF
AN EMERGING AMERICAN INDIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (Eric Lemont ed., forthcoming University
of Texas Press); Porter, supra note 3.
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exercising greater political sovereignty and enhancing prospects for increased
political and economic development.5
Although many American Indian nations have decided to reexamine their
constitutions, the process of reform has proven incredibly difficult. First,
American Indian nations' historical relationships with the United States
complicate the nature of the questions they are seeking to answer through
constitutional reform. Unlike the Founding Fathers of the United States
Constitution, American Indian nations do not have the luxury of coming to
agreement on the political "rules of the game" within well-accepted political and
cultural norms. Rather, they are engaged in a fundamental rethinking over how
to balance entrenched, western institutions with often competing traditional,
cultural and political values. Moreover, centuries of physical separations,
cultural fragmentation and various degrees of assimilation have diversified
cultural and political viewpoints within tribal communities. This, in turn, has
made the process of finding constitutional consensus - always a difficult
proposition - even more elusive.
In addition to these unique constraints, American Indian nations also confront
universal challenges associated with the politics of reform. Throughout the
world, a central concern of political reformers has been preventing incumbent
institutions and officeholders from directing reforms to their own self-interests.
From Africa to Eastern Europe to individual American states, stories abound of
parliaments and congressional bodies seeking to maintain the status quo by
refusing to heed calls for reform, assuming complete control over the reform
process, or creating commissions and other reform bodies that serve at their
pleasure.
A central question therefore is how can nations engage in governmental and
constitutional reform when those currently holding political power control the
levers of change? This inquiry applies especially forcefully to Indian Country,
where political power is often concentrated in small tribal councils and where
constitutional reform realistically cannot take place without Council approval.
While a political or economic crisis can certainly help catalyze reform, there still
remains the question of how to engage in a process of reform that is not overly
influenced by the incumbent government.
5. For arguments tying strengthened governmental institutions to greater stability and the
exercise of increased political sovereignty, see Porter, supra note 3. For a connection between
strengthened American Indian governmental institutions and enhanced economic development,
see Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Sovereignty and Nation-Building: The Development
Challenge in Indian Country Today, 22 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & REs. J. 3 (1998).
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For all of these reasons, American Indian nations interested in constitutional
and governmental reform face the critical challenge of first developing reform
processes that create the necessary political space within which leaders and
citizens can develop stronger, more accountable and more culturally matched
governments.
To date, there has been relatively little written of how American Indian
nations have navigated this difficult, layered process of constitutional reform.6
Unlike countries engaged in post-colonial constitution-making in Eastern
Europe and Africa, most American Indian nations have traveled along their own
roads of reform in a context of informational isolation. While the reform
priorities of American Indian nations vary by political circumstance, history and
culture, examining the reform processes of individual American Indian nations
can identify common issues, provide interested nations with insights and ideas
for their own reform processes, and lay the groundwork for more in-depth
comparative analysis.
The Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma is a good case study for two reasons.
First, it demonstrates the power of tribal institutions to catalyze legitimate
processes of reform. Specifically notable is the Nation's creation of an
independent Cherokee Nation Constitution Commission that was successful
both in overcoming biases toward retaining the political status quo and engaging
widespread citizen participation in the reform process. Perhaps most important
is the Commission's success in organizing the Cherokee Nation Constitution
Convention - a sovereign arena where deep issues of governance could be
legitimately raised, debated and decided. Second, the Nation's substantive
debates at the Constitution Convention, such as blood quantum requirements for
candidates for Principal Chief, judicial restructuring, and representation for off-
reservation residents, reflect many of the substantive reform challenges faced by
American Indian nations as they have assumed ever greater governmental
responsibilities over the past twenty-five years. Together, the work of the
Commission and the debates at the Convention provide a unique window into
one Nation's successful process for addressing fundamental questions of
governance.
The first part of this article gives a brief sketch of the Nation's history,
including a short discussion of the origins and structure of its current 1976
Constitution. The second part pulls together newspaper accounts, transcripts,
and personal interviews to describe in detail how the Nation engaged in a
legitimate process of constitutional reform during the middle of a searing
6. One exception is Ian Wilson Record, Broken Government: Constitutional Inadequacy
Spawns Conflict at San Carlos, NATIVE AM., Spring 1999, at 10-16.
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political crisis. It discusses how the Nation formed an independent Cherokee
Nation Constitution Convention Commission representative of the Nation's
warring political factions. It also examines the Commission's intensive
approach to obtaining widespread citizen participation in all stages of the reform
process and its unique method for choosing Convention delegates. The third
part highlights some of the major debates that took place during the Nation's
nine-day Constitutional Convention, including arguments over bicameralism,
citizenship and blood quantum, political representation for off-reservation
residents, and judicial restructuring. The fourth part documents the Nation's
four year struggle to ratify the constitution adopted at the Convention. This part
discusses internal debates within the Nation over the proper meaning of a
constitution, the Nation's struggle to obtain approval of the proposed
constitution from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the massive public education
initiative conducted by the Constitution Commission in preparation for the
Nation's July 2003 national referendum ratifying the Constitution. The fifth part
offers concluding thoughts.
I. Background
The original members of the Nation resided in the foothills of the
Appalachian Mountains in Georgia and Tennessee. Political decision making
was decentralized to largely autonomous local villages and towns, which
encountered problems with white settlers almost immediately.7 By the early
Nineteenth Century, the Nation began altering its traditional government
structures and adopting U.S.-style governing institutions as a defensive strategy
to ward off accusations that it was barbarous and unfit to keep its land.' In
1827, the Nation elected delegates to a constitutional convention and adopted
its first constitution, complete with a three branch government, a bicameral
legislature, and a bill of rights.
Notwithstanding the Nation's best efforts, relations with the U.S.
Government soon reached its historic low point. In 1839, Andrew Jackson
ordered the infamous "Trail of Tears" removal of thousands of Cherokees to
Oklahoma. Upon arrival in Oklahoma, a dominant Cherokee faction organized
another constitutional convention and drafted the Nation's second constitution,
based to a large extent on the earlier 1827 Constitution written in Georgia.
7. For an in-depth historical analysis of Cherokee politics and government, see DUANE
CHAMPAGNE, SOCIAL ORDER AND POLITICAL CHANGE: CONSTITUTIONALGOVERNMENTS AMONG
THE CHEROKEE, THE CHOCTAW, THE CHICKASAW, AND THE CREEK (1992).
8. See DUANE CHAMPAGNE, AMERICAN INDIAN SOCIETIES: STRATEGIES AND CONDITIONS
OF POLITICAL AND CULTURAL SURVIVAL 42 (Cultural Survival Rep. No. 32, 1989).
No. 11
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Although suffering in the 1840s from a period of internal conflict -
exacerbated in part because of the exclusion from the 1839 constitution-making
process of several Cherokee political factions - the Nation soon entered into
what is commonly known as its "Golden Age." The Nation established over 100
college-level and public schools, a tribal newspaper, and an economy that made
poverty "practically unknown." 9 The Nation's Golden Age ended abruptly with
the U.S. Civil War. Its 1866 Reconstruction Treaty with the victorious Union
forced the Nation to surrender land and open its territory to railroads. " During
the 1880s and 1890s, the United States placed increasing pressures on the
Nation to sell land to burgeoning railroads and, later, to incorporate the Nation
into a territory of the U.S. Government. " In 1893, the U.S. Government formed
the Dawes Commission to create a roll of citizens of five Oklahoma tribes,
including the Nation, for the purpose of dividing up the Nation's land into
individual allotments. In 1898, the U.S. Congress passed legislation accelerating
the process of allotment and formally mandating the abolition of the Cherokee
government by 1906.12
From 1907 through 1970, the Cherokee Nation functioned without a
government. During this time, the U.S. Government appointed a Principal
Chief, who did little more than approve leases and sign documents transferring
out the last of the allotments. More than sixty years later, the Nation
reconstituted itself and obtained recognition by the U.S. Government in 1970.
The intervening decades without a functioning government, however, had taken
its toll. Through a combination of allotment forgeries, embezzlements, misuse
of notary seals, and other crimes, the overwhelming majority of land allotted to'
Cherokee citizens found its way into white hands."3 The Nation's population
had fallen to only 40,000 citizens and federal agencies of the U.S. Government
had taken over responsibility for delivering services to individual Cherokee
allottees.
9. Rennard Strickland & William M. Strickland, Beyond the Trail of Tears: One Hundred
Fifty Years of Cherokee Survival, in CHEROKEE REMOVAL: BEFORE AND AFTER 112, 114-15
(William L. Anderson ed., 1991).
10. Id. at 117.
11. See generally MORRIS L. WARDELL, A POLITICAL HISTORY OFTHE CHEROKEE NATION,
1838-1907, at ch. 8 (1938).
12. Curtis Act, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495 (1898), repealed by Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2000).
13. Records from 1985 from the Bureau of Indian Affairs show that "fewer than 65,000
acres of the 20 million allotted [to Cherokee citizens] remain in tribal hands." STRICKLAND &
STRICKLAND, supra note 9, at 126.
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A. Current 1976 Constitution
Before serving as Principal Chief of the Nation from 1975 to 1985 and
heading the U.S. Department of Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs in the
Reagan Administration, Ross Swimmer played a large role in helping to
construct the Nation's modem government. With the beginning of the U.S.
Government's policy of self-determination in the mid-1970s, Swimmer and
other Cherokee leaders began looking for ways to access the new inflow of
federal funds into tribal communities. Swimmer saw federal funds as "a big
impetus" for the Nation to organize its government and adopt a new
constitution. 4 By the time Swimmer was elected Principal Chief in 1975, a
cluster of community representatives had already been working on a new
constitution for over ten years.' 5 According to Swimmer, the process of reform
"was all over the place" with some people "wanting to recreate the 1839
constitution." Soon after being sworn in, Swimmer, frustrated at the slow pace
of reform, decided to form a small group that would complete work on a new
constitution. 6
14. Swimmer said that in Eastern Oklahoma:
A lot of federal help was being given to tribes in the west, but none in Oklahoma,
because again we didn't have organized tribes. This was also an impetus, a big
impetus, for the adoption of a constitution.... I saw this opportunity with the
federal money that was coming in that we could use that and turn it into a useful
tool that we could do some things in Eastern Oklahoma.
Interview with Ross Swimmer, former Principal Chief, Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, in Tulsa,
Okla. (Sept. 4, 2000).
15. Swimmer elaborated on the representatives:
In 1967 or '68, Bill Keeler, had assembled a group of Cherokees in Eastern
Oklahoma to look at the formation of a constitution, not necessarily, I think, with
the idea in mind of a governing document but something that would, from a social
point of view, give more people the opportunity to focus on the services, the
Indian health services, the BIA services, and provide some input to the leadership,
to the chief, for how those services could be better delivered to tribal members.
Ross Swimmer, former Principal Chief, Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, Address at John F.
Kennedy School of Government Symposium on American Indian Constitutional and
Governmental Reform (Apr. 2, 2001) (transcript on file with author).
16. Swimmer explained the dilemma:
At that time we had all these myriad of drafts, we've been holding public hearings,
we've gone through the community reps and it had just like seemed that we just
weren't going to get there. So I had several people that I gathered together and we
sat down and drafted a final version of the constitution and said "this is it." And
we put it out for a vote and it got passed.
Interview with Ross Swimmer, supra note 14. Swimmer said later in a separate context:
And then there were a couple of other things that needed some revision, I felt,
from what the constitutional committee had been putting together. I had some
No. 1]
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The Nation's current 1976 Constitution supersedes completely the 1839
Constitution. It divides the Cherokee government into three branches. The
legislature consists of a single-body Tribal Council, composed of fifteen
members elected at large 7 from the Nation's fourteen districts. 18 Executive
power is vested in a Principal Chief and a Deputy Principal Chief, elected to
four-year terms of office. The Deputy Principal Chief also serves as President
of the Council, with the power to cast tie-breaking votes.' 9 The Judiciary is
comprised of a three-member Judicial Appeals Tribunal (the Nation's Supreme
Court) and other courts that the Council may choose to establish.20 The
Constitution incorporates the protections of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act
and contains provisions for referendum and initiative.
Swimmer says he viewed the Cherokee Nation "not necessarily as a
government but as an organization," a cross "between a non-profit and a profit-
making business" whose specific "purpose was to enhance the living conditions
of the people."'" He therefore based the Constitution on "a corporate model"
opposition and people said well, it's not ready yet, you can't do this, one thing after
another. I went ahead and took it to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, we got them to
sign off on it, and in 1976 we took it to a vote and it was overwhelmingly adopted.
I don't think the people had a clue as to what they were voting on. They accepted
that we needed something, but they still, you can imagine, I mean up until that
time the only government the Cherokee people were aware of in Eastern
Oklahoma was county, state, city and local government. They were totally under
the law of the state. They were totally under county police jurisdiction, that kind
of thing. And in fact, in 1975 if somebody had suggested to me that the Cherokee
Nation had tax powers, or that I, as principal chief, had the opportunity to
incarcerate my fellow Cherokees for crimes they might commit, I would have said
they were crazy. I would have said there is no such thing. We don't have that
kind of sovereignty. In fact, as I recall, we were operating a restaurant and a motel
and we were still collecting sales taxes to send to the state. That went on for
several years until I finally woke up and said "well why are we doing this?"
Address by Ross Swimmer, supra note 15.
17. CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA CONST. art. V, § 3.
18. Alison Vekshin, BIA Declines to Take Up Cherokee Chief Challenge, TIMES RECORD
(Ft. Smith, Ark.) Aug. 8,2003, available at http://www.swtimes.com/archive/2003/August/08/
news/BIA.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
19. CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA CONST. art. VI, § 11.
20. In 1990, the Nation passed legislation creating a District Court with one or morejudges.
20 CHEROKEE NATION CODE § I 1 (1993).
21. Swimmer said that in Oklahoma,
[t]here's such an assimilation that we look to the local, state, county, federal
governments for primary services and the Cherokee Nation sort of then overlaps
all of these services yet they have to be careful where they go because their
jurisdiction is only over certain areas. It's real complicated. And that's why I had
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with Council members serving in positions akin to members of a Board of
Directors.22 In Swimmer's view, a bicameral legislature, discussed at length in
discussions leading up to the new Constitution, would have been too "unwieldy"
and not useful for the quick receipt and disbursement of federal funds:
[A bicameral legislature] would have meant about sixty or seventy-
five people in the government of the tribe. And it was a personal
privilege - I didn't like that. I thought we'd never get anything
done. And so I said let's cut that out and let's just have a tribal
council to act as a legislature and we pegged the number at fifteen.
There wasn't a lot of thought that went into that, but we decided on
fifteen as a good number.23
Swimmer grounds his preference for a unicameral, corporate form of
government in the context of the time. For almost seventy years, the Nation had
had no enrollment and no government. Services were delivered directly from
the U.S. Government to individual Cherokee allottees. Swimmer says that
before the era of self-determination, he never could have imagined that the
Nation would one day exercise taxing powers or have a court system that could
incarcerate Cherokee citizens and handle adoption cases. Instead of creating a
government, Swimmer simply wanted to organize a system for the improvement
of the delivery of services to individual Cherokees:
not envisioned, and perhaps I was being shortsighted, I don't know, but when we
adopted the constitution I said it was more of a corporate document, a
development authority. I mean our job was to help improve lives. It wasn't to
create a government. I never envisioned having 2,000 or 3,000 people working
for the government. I envisioned them working... and I always thought at some
point we would reach a peak and then we would start declining in employment
because we would be able to say, "we have created the result that we want, people
are working, we don't need to be there any longer. We can have fewer social
workers than we had yesterday."
Interview with Ross Swimmer, supra note 14.
22. Swimmer commented on his thoughts:
I think actually I was probably thinking again of a corporate model. I was
thinking more of a Board of Directors .... And the rest of it, the executive branch
and the judicial branch is pretty straightforward. It was mainly in the legislative
arena that I suggested we make those changes and make it a 15 member council.
Id.
23. Address by Ross Swimmer, supra note 15. Swimmer said in a different context that
"the final document that was being considered as I recall would have two houses of the
legislature and we would wind up electing around 100 people. And that's the part that I took
out. I just said, 'look, we're not going to do that."' Interview with Ross Swimmer, supra note
14.
No. 1]
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The court, for instance, its only purpose at the time was to handle
disputes between the executive and legislative bodies. It had no
outside function. It was going to be an internal court. The
legislative body was there to review programs and sign off for the
most part on federal programs and appropriations to the tribe. And,
of course, the executive body was to administer those programs that
came in and do whatever it could to improve the living conditions of
Cherokees in Eastern Oklahoma."
24
Two specific provisions in Article XV of the 1976 Constitution later proved to
play key roles in the Nation's recent constitutional reform process. Article XV,
Section 9 requires that the question of a proposed constitutional convention be
submitted to the members of the Cherokee Nation at least once every twenty
years.25  Article XV, Section 10 requires that any new constitution or
amendment receive the approval of the President of the United States or his
authorized representative. While Section 9 helped to launch the Nation's
process of political reform, Section 10 proved responsible for producing a four
year delay in the ultimate ratification of the Nation's constitution.
B. 1997-1999 Constitutional Crisis
It would have been very difficult to predict in the early 1990s the emergence
of the Nation's constitutional crisis several years later. With approximately
230,000 members, the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma is the second largest
American Indian nation in the United States. From the mid-1970s through the
mid-1990s, the Nation prospered under its 1976 constitution and enjoyed a
reputation as one of the most stable and autonomous nations in Indian Country.
Swimmer served as Principal Chief for ten years before becoming the head of
the Department of Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1985. His successor,
Wilma Mankiller, became the Nation's first woman Principal Chief, also served
for ten years, and became a prominent national leader.
The Nation's stability began to unravel in the 1995 election for Principal
Chief. Mankiller's choice as her successor was disqualified by the Nation's
election board and, in a runoff election, Joe Byrd was elected as Principal Chief
24. Interview with Ross Swimmer, supra note 14. Swimmer said in a different context that
he wanted to "give more people the opportunity to focus on the services [delivered by HIS and
BIA] and provide some input to the leadership, to the chief, for how those services could be
better delivered to tribal members." Address by Ross Swimmer, supra note 15.
25. Swimmer said he had come across a similar provision in another state or tribal
constitution. Interview with Ross Swimmer, supra note 14.
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with less than 5000 votes. The real trouble, however, began in February of
1997, when the Nation's highest court authorized Cherokee marshals to search
Byrd's offices for evidence of illegal activity. In retaliation, Byrd and half of the
Council impeached all threejustices, replaced the Nation's marshal service with
a private security force, and forcibly overtook the Nation's courthouse 6.2  The
crisis became a national affair when a melee erupted as the fired marshals and
justices tried to retake the courthouse in August 1997.27 With the threat of
Congressional intervention hanging over them, the two sides reluctantly agreed
to a meeting mediated by Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt in the summer of
1997.28 But the truce did not last long. In the early months of 1998, Byrd
moved the district court- responsible for hearing obstruction ofjustice charges
against him - out of the tribal courthouse and into the tribal administration
building near his office.29 Beginning in April 1998, six Council members
boycotted scheduled Council meetings for over a year to prevent a quorum and
official Council actions until the district court was moved back to the
courthouse.3 °
II. Launching a Process of Constitutional Reform
A. Creation of Independent Constitution Convention Commission
In early 1999, during the middle of the crisis that was tearing the Nation
apart, a group of seventy-nine Cherokee citizens were spending nine days at a
local university trying to lay a foundation for putting it back together. How the
Nation pulled together a true cross-section of Cherokee citizens to serve as
delegates in a full-fledged Constitutional Convention during the middle of a
political crisis is a powerful story dating back several years before the crisis.
The year 1995 marked the twentieth anniversary of the Nation's present
constitution. Pursuant to Article XV, Section 9, it also marked the constitutional
26. Rob Martindale, Tribal Foes Talk After Big Ruckus, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 15, 1997, at
Al.
27. Id.
28. The sides agreed to accept the opinion of an independent investigation into the
constitutionality of the impeachment of the justices, the reopening of the Nation's courthouse,
and a moratorium on all legal action related to the crisis. Jim Myers & Rob Martindale,
Cherokee Negotiations BreakDown; Byrd Refuses to Recognize Justices, Official Says, TULSA
WORLD, Aug. 23, 1997, at Al.
29. Rob Martindale, BIA Chief Vows to Help Forge Resolution to Cherokee Crisis, TULSA
WORLD, June 9, 1998, at 7.
30. Associated Press, Judge Orders Boycotting Cherokee Council Members to Attend
Meetings (June 14, 1999).
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twenty-year deadline for asking the Cherokee citizenry to vote on the question
of a constitution convention. In the summer of 1995, Cherokee voters at a
general election overwhelmingly approved the calling of a convention.3
Importantly, although the Constitution required a vote on calling a convention,
it did not specify when the convention actually needed to take place. For three
years, the tribal administration did not take any action to plan a Convention and
the issue faded off of the political map.32
As the years slowly crept by, the Cherokee voters' mandate for a convention
collided with the Nation's political crisis. At various points during the crisis,
several individuals on both sides of the political fence began pushing the
Nation's government to begin work on the convention. Charles Gourd, a
member of the Byrd administration, and Troy Wayne Poteete, the Chair of the
Council's Rules Committee, along with others ultimately were successful in
getting the Rules Committee to begin laying the groundwork for the
convention.33
Planning a convention in the middle of a constitutional crisis was no easy
task. Poteete, the point person on the Rules Committee, was most concerned
about the political challenges of beginning the reform process. The difficulty
lay in obtaining Council approval for launching a constitutional reform process
without letting the process become subject to the same political forces
associated with the crisis. Faced with the monumental nature of the task,
Poteete and others reached out to a variety of outside experts before finally
deciding to form a constitutional commission.
In March 1998 each of the three branches of government appointed two
representatives to serve on a newly formed Cherokee Nation Constitution
Convention Commission. The six commissioners then collectively chose a
31. Jay Hannah, The 1999 Constitution Convention of the Cherokee Nation: Process of a
Sovereign People (Mar. 2000), at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/reform/images/hannah.pdf
[hereinafter Hannah Paper] (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
32. Poteete said, "I don't remember any political focus on the question. I don't remember
so much as a press release or a footnote to a memorandum." Poteete believes that the three year
delay was due to other pressing priorities. The government was tackling election and campaign
contribution law reforms and was also deeply involved in negotiations with the Delaware and
Shawnee Indians over their desire to separate from the Nation and form their own independent
nations. For all of these reasons, Poteete said the "Constitution Convention ... it could wait.
It kept getting pushed back." Interview with Troy Wayne Poteete, Former Chair, Cherokee
Nation of Okla. Tribal Council Rules Committee, in Tahlequah, Okla (Sept. 2, 2000).
33. Interview with Charles Gourd, Member, Cherokee Nation Constitution Commission,
in Tahlequah, Okla. (June 25, 2000).
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seventh member.' The selection process was modeled on that of the Nation's
election commission. 3 Byrd appointed two representatives from the executive
branch, whose interests were countered by the judiciary's two representatives.
A Council split between Byrd supporters and opponents named the remaining
two representatives. By allowing for appointees from each branch of
government, both the pro and anti-Byrd camps thought that they could gain
something from inclusion on the Commission.36 At the same time, the
Commission's structure allowed it to operate without being unduly influenced
and controlled by either side.
In order to reinforce the perception of political neutrality, Commission
members were sworn in at Sequoyah High School, and not at the tribal
administration building.37 After creating the Commission, the Council left it up
to the Commissioners to develop their own empowering legislation."
Assuaging their own mutual mistrust and signaling their credibility as a body,
the Commissioners decided collectively to take an oath of political neutrality,
refrain from holding political office, hold open meetings and act only upon
unanimity.39
Almost immediately the Commissioners, compensated with a stipend of $250
per month, began asserting their independence. When representatives from the
Bureau of Indian Affairs tried to persuade the Commission to amend the
Constitution under the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, Commission members
refused.4" The real test of the Commission's strength, however, came in the
summer of 1998 when it sought Council ratification of its enabling legislation.
The Commissioners not only had to call the divided Council together for a
special meeting to approve the legislation (no easy task during the period of
34. Hannah Paper, supra note 31.
35. Interview with Troy Wayne Poteete, supra note 32. Commissioner Marion Hagerstrand
said, in reference to the system of appointment: 'That's the way Cherokees do things."
Interview with Marion Hagerstrand, Member, Cherokee National Constitution Commission, in
Tahlequah, Okla. (June 25, 2000).
36. Swimmer said "the move was on both sides" to begin the process of reform. Interview
with Ross Swimmer, supra note 14.
37. Interview with Jay Hannah, Member, Cherokee Nation Constitution Commission, in
Tahlequah, Okla. (June 24, 2000).
38. "While the Rules Committee of the Tribal Council had promulgated the creation of the
commission and outlined its primary mission, empowering legislation was left to the newly
appointed commissioners to write and submit to the Tribal Council for approval." Hannah
Paper, supra note 31.
39. Interview with Charles Gourd, supra note 33.
40. Interview with Jay Hannah, Member, Cherokee Nation Constitution Commission, in
Tahlequah, Okla. (June 25, 2000).
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Council meeting boycotts by six of its members), but also had to break free from
the Council's oversight. At first, the Council initially wanted to limit the
Commission's authority to that of a recommending body." Poteete admits he
was "a little apprehensive" about an independent commission and initially asked
that the Commission "go out to the public, get their feelings, report back to
Council, tell us what is legislative (should be put in ordinance), what should be
in the Constitution and we'll decide what to put on the ballot." By this time,
however, the Commission had already established an identity of its own. After
earlier agreeing to an oath of political neutrality, the seven Commissioners
responded to the Council with an ultimatum: "We stay independent or we
walk."42
After what one Commission member described as a "dogfight" to preserve
the Commission's independence, the Council eventually approved the
Commission's enabling legislation in 1998.4' The legislation contained
language confirming the Commission as "an independent commission" whose
authority "shall not be subject to direction or supervision by the executive,
legislative orjudicial branch of the Cherokee Nation government."' It granted
the Commission "sole responsibility and explicit authority for the conduct of the
Constitution Convention" and allowed the Commission to place a new
constitution or set of amendments directly on the ballot for a referendum vote
by the citizens of the Nation.45 Importantly, the Council allocated the
Commission an initial budget of $250,000 to begin its work. Cumulatively, the
combination of a willful Commission, a weak Council and a perception by both
political sides of potential benefits from reform contributed to securing the
Commission's independence.
B. Engaging and Informing the Public
The enabling legislation placed an overarching priority on the Commission's
responsibility for educating Cherokee citizens about the initiation of the
Nation's constitutional reform and achieving widespread citizen participation
in the process. The Commission's first step was to foster a culture of openness,
41. Interview with Charles Gourd, supra note 33.
42. Id.
43. As recalled by Commissioner Charles Gourd, it was a "dogfight to keep the
Commission completely independent from the three branches of government and make it a
citizen's Commission." Interview with Charles Gourd, supra note 33.
44. Act Creating a Constitution Convention Commission § 4A, Legislative Act No. 10-98
(Cherokee Nation May 15, 1998), available at http://wwww.cherokee.org/TribalGovemment/
CCCArchivePage.asp?ID=Act (last visited Sept. 22, 2003).
45. Id. §§ 4A, 4D.
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which the commissioners felt was essential due to the crisis atmosphere at the
time. The Commission made this commitment concrete by publishing a
schedule of all of its meetings and making them open to everyone, including
nontribal media sources.46
The heart of the Commission's outreach efforts, however, consisted of a well-
planned series of public hearings, both within and outside the reservation. From
September 1998 through January 1999 the Commission held approximately
twenty public hearings, providing citizens with the opportunity to provide both
written and oral testimony expressing their views on constitutional changes. A
critical decision, and one that would later have a significant impact on the
Convention itself, was the Commission's commitment to hold several public
hearings outside of the historical boundaries of the reservation, home to
approximately forty percent of the Nation's citizens.47 The Commission held
public hearings in several cities, including Tulsa, Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles
and Sacramento.
Altogether, attendance at the public hearings ranged from two to 200 people
and generated over 800 pages of testimony.48 To ensure consistency, the
Commission developed and published rules for the taking of testimony, required
the presence of at least three commissioners at each hearing, and determined
hearing locations based on voter precinct locations established by the Election
Commission.49 The Commission made use of both direct mail pieces and media
releases to publicize awareness of the hearings and kept a permanent record of
all testimony.5°
The Commission supplemented its public hearings with innovative uses of the
Nation's website - posting testimony from public hearings, providing status
reports of the Commission's work on a periodic basis, and establishing a chat
room for citizens to post additional suggestions and reactions about proposed
46. Id.
47. The Commission's enabling legislation required public hearings in all out-of-state area
major metropolitan centers having more than 500 Cherokee citizens. Id. § 4(D)(6).
48. One commissioner attributed the low numbers at several meetings to a lack of access
to mailing lists of tribal members and a lack of funds to perform targeted mailings. He believes
that attendance could have been improved with improved cooperation with the Nation's
newspaper and website.
49. Id. §§ 4(D)(4), 4(D)(5).
50. Id. § 4(D)(8).
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constitutional revisions."' The Commission later posted on the website the
transcripts from the nine-day Convention itself.
The Commission made use of the testimony from the public hearings and
other sources of community input to develop and disseminate an "issues list" for
focusing additional debate and discussion. Ultimately, the Commission
concluded that the public comments were too wide-ranging, diverse, and in
some instances contradictory, to be translated into amendments to the Nation's
current Constitution. Instead, the Commission used the "issues list" to draft a
proposed new Constitution that would serve as the basis of debate at the
Convention.
C. Choosing Convention Delegates
The most difficult task faced by the Commission was determining a method
for choosing delegates to the Convention, a process Poteete described later as
"an opportunity to undo ourselves."52 A formidable challenge under any
circumstance, the ongoing political crisis involving all three branches placed an
even higher premium on developing a process that all sides would accept as
legitimate.
The Commission decided against the traditional practice of electing
Convention delegates for several reasons, including the logistical and financial
difficulties of determining nominating processes, apportioning delegates by
electoral districts, and holding an election. Instead, the Commission developed
an original and multifaceted method for choosing the seventy-nine Convention
delegates. The first twenty-four delegates were composed of eight appointees
from each of the three branches of government. The Commission then selected
the second twenty-four delegates from a pool of citizens who had given
testimony at public hearings. The Commission chose the third set of twenty-four
delegates by lottery from a pool of applicants The drawing was held in an open
meeting with considerable media attendance. The seven Commission members
themselves filled the final remaining delegate seats.
The Commission's method ensured representation in the Convention of all
political parties. Not surprisingly, executive branch delegates were pro-Byrd,
judicial appointees were Byrd opponents, and legislative branch delegates -
like the Council itself - were split between pro and anti-Byrd delegates. As
51. Even with all of the Commission's efforts to reach out to Cherokee citizens through
public meetings, newsletters, and website materials, however, certain individuals have criticized
it for not sufficiently reaching out to all Cherokees, including those residing in the Nation's
more traditional communities.
52. Interview with Troy Wayne Poteete, supra note 32.
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Poteete said, we "had every faction represented."53 The delegates to the
Constitutional Convention comprised a cross-section of Cherokee society, one
whose members diverged by age, degrees of Cherokee blood quantum, and
educational and occupational background. 4 While afew delegates were current
or former elected tribal officials, most had no previous political experience."
Only nineteen of the seventy-nine delegates resided outside of the historic
boundaries of the Nation.56
D. Overview and Ground Rules of Constitutional Convention
On February, 26, 1999, the seventy-nine delegates to the Cherokee Nation
Constitution Convention assembled for the first day of a nine-day convention at
Northeastern State University, just outside the Nation's capitol in Tahlequah,
Oklahoma.57 As one delegate later described "the tension between the pro and
anti-Byrd administration delegates was so thick you could cut it with a knife"
and "there were times ... when it was just downright hard to breathe."58
Consistent with its approach throughout the reform process, the Commission
opened the Convention proceedings to nondelegates, including nontribal media
sources.59 In order to accommodate the views of seventy-nine delegates in a
finite amount of time, the Commission introduced Roberts' Rules of Order,
which the delegates voted to accept as the Convention's procedural ground
rules. 6°
Just as the Commissioners had asserted their independence from the Council,
the delegates quickly asserted their independence from the Commission. The
very first motion replaced the Commission's choice for Convention Chair -
seen as too closely aligned with Byrd - with Jay Hannah, another Commission
member and an Oklahoma banker seen as more politically neutral.61 The
53. Id.
54. Hannah Paper, supra note 31.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. The Commission originally planned the Convention to last for only three days.
58. Address by Martha Berry, supra note 2.
59. The Commission's Chair, Ralph Keen, Jr., said that the Commission was aware that the
U.S. Constitutional Convention was held in secret but "disagreed with that philosophy."
Interview with Ralph Keen, Jr., Member, Cherokee Nation Constitution Commission, in
Tahlequah, Okla. (June 25, 2000).
60. Hannah said Roberts' Rules were "absolutely essential to success of the convention.
Everyone embraced that there had to be order and structure to what we were doing." Interview
with Jay Hannah, supra note 37.
61. 1 CHEROKEE NATION CONsTrrurION CONVENTION TRANSCRIPr OF PROCEEDINGS 7-15
(1999) (transcript of Feb. 26, 1999) [hereinafter CHEROKEE CONSTrrUTION CONVENTION
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delegates then moved to amend the ground rules for raising and debating
constitutional amendments during the Convention. Feeling that limiting debate
only to the Commission's proposed constitution would undercut the
Convention's autonomy and range of options, the delegation voted to allow any
delegate to introduce proposed new language.
Convention delegates agreed to vote on proposed amendments to the Nation's
current constitution on a section by section basis. When voice votes were
inconclusive, the convention utilized standing votes and roll call votes. Once
delegates worked their way through the entire 1976 Constitution in this fashion,
a final vote was to approve the proposed new constitution in its entirety.62
Finally, although never explicitly addressed, the fourteen delegates who were
also Cherokee lawyers were treated just like the other sixty-five delegates. In
the vast majority of instances, the delegation suggested, discussed and debated
proposed new constitutional language as a group. For certain sections with legal
"terms of art," particularly sections pertaining to the powers of the judiciary,
lawyer-delegates took a leading role in suggesting, defining and clarifying
proposed language.63 In other instances, lawyers joined nonlawyers in small
break-out groups to draft language that they then reported back to the
Convention as a whole for further discussion and debate. On one occasion,
lawyer-delegates even passed around copies of Black's Law Dictionary so that
other delegates could review definitions of legal terms. At least one delegate
reported that the Convention's "lawyers helped with the proper format of
amendments even if they didn't agree with its substance."'
TRANSCRIPTS].
62. Another interesting and important ground rule was developed halfway through the
Convention to address the problem of spectator lobbying of delegates. Delegates who smoke,
for example, were lobbied consistently during breaks. One lobbyist passed out information on
delegates' chairs during a break in the proceedings. Others whispered in delegates' ears during
votes. Some nondelegates even tried to participate in voice votes. Some simply heckled. To
counteract lobbying, Hannah required nondelegates to sit at least four rows back from delegates,
hired a sergeant at arms, and moved furniture to physically separate delegates from nondelegates
during breaks. Interview with Jay Hannah, supra note 37.
63. For examples, see 6 CHEROKEE CONSTITUTION CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, supra note
61, at 44-46 (transcript of Mar. 3, 1999) (describing legal definitions of mandamus, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto and discussion among delegates for need to use clearest possible
language).
64. Interview with Julia Coates Foster, Delegate, Cherokee Nation Constitution
Convention, in Tahlequah, Okla. (June 24, 2001).
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Il. Major Areas of Reform Debated at Constitution Convention
Topics dominating discussion at the Commission's public hearings and the
Convention itself fell into two broad categories. The first set consisted of
concrete proposals for strengthening the accountability and effectiveness of
the Nation's government. Many of these concerns were raised in direct
response to the Nation's crisis. During the Commission's public hearings,
citizens called for procedures allowing for the recall of elected officials, the
holding of mandatory community meetings by Council members in their
respective districts, open financial records of the Nation's government,
publication of the Nation's laws, the creation of an independent election
commission, and better publicized notices of open Council meetings.
A number of these concerns subsequently were addressed at the
Convention, with delegates voting to create a permanent record of the
Nation's laws, remove language requiring their approval by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, stagger terms and implement term limits for Council members,
create an independent election commission, and remove the Deputy Principal
Chief from service as President of the Council.
A second set of reform proposals stemmed from the growing disconnect
between the constitution's corporate model of government and the Nation's
phenomenal growth in population, diversity and assumption of governmental
responsibilities over the past three decades. Between 1970 and 1999, the
Nation's population had grown from 40,000 to over 200,000. The government
had contracted or compacted with the U.S. Government in a host of different
areas, including housing, health, economic development, elderly programs,
education, and environmental management. As a result, the Nation's budget
had ballooned from $10,000 to $192 million.65 This change in the size of the
Nation's government matched an equally dramatic change in the Nation's
demographics. The absence of a blood quantum requirement in the
constitution and the passing of a generation had combined to lower the
average blood quantum of the Nation's citizenry by the time of the
Convention. And the Nation's citizens, once concentrated in Oklahoma, were
increasingly living in places as far-flung as Texas and California.
In the minds of many citizens, Swimmer's 1976 Constitution simply could
not keep up with the Nation's increased governmental responsibilities and the
competing demands of a larger and more diverse citizenry - one whose
interests diverged by residency, blood quantum and culture. These pressures
65. The $10,000 amount comes from an interview with Ross Swimmer. The $192 million
comes from e-mail correspondence with Jay Hannah, the Nation's Treasurer.
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manifested themselves in debates over a return to a bicameral form of
government, a stronger and more independent judiciary, political
representation for Cherokee citizens living off-reservation, and minimum
blood quantum requirements for candidates for Principal Chief exemplify.
The following sections briefly summarize the Convention debates of these
four topics. To varying extents, they reflect similar discussions engaged in by
other American Indian nations. They also serve as important bridges to larger
questions of American Indian citizenship, governance, and nationhood.
Collectively, they demonstrate how the difficult task of reforming entrenched
governmental institutions can be achieved.
A. Bicameralism
One of the first major convention debates involved whether the Nation
should return to the bicameral form of government of the Nation's 1827 and
1839 constitutions. Across Indian Country, the overwhelming majority of
tribal governments concentrate legislative power in unicameral tribal councils.
During the nineteenth century, the U.S. Government - frustrated at tribes'
slow, consensus-oriented method of political decision making - began
pressuring tribes to form small tribal bodies capable of quickly approving
treaties and agreements. The trend became entrenched with the adoption by
dozens of tribes of generic constitutions developed under the 1934 Indian
Reorganization Act. IRA constitutions generally follow a similar format,
including the vesting of legislative power in unicameral tribal councils that
often consist of less than fifteen members.
Tribal councils were never intended to reflect and balance sociocultural
groupings within tribes, such as family allegiances, clans or bands. Nor were
they intended to allow for the efficient operation of sovereign tribal
governments. Like Swimmer's 1976 Constitution, the motivation for
unicameral councils was to facilitate the receipt and disbursement of federal
funds through a corporate structure. Underscoring the point, many IRA
constitutions include "bylaws" naming and describing the duties of individual
members of the Council as President, Secretary, and Treasurer. Relative to
other branches of government, most tribal councils have vast and relatively
unchecked powers.
The limitations of tribal councils have been exacerbated as American
Indian nations have grown and diversified. Noting the need for more
responsive, capable and culturally grounded institutions, Indian scholar Duane
Champagne has underlined the ability of bicameral legislatures to both
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enhance government stability and give formal political recognition to
sociopolitical groupings within tribes.66
On the second day of the convention, John Keen introduced a motion for
the Convention to consider a return to bicameralism. Keen argued that the
Nation's current unicameral form of government had allowed nine persons -
the Principal Chief and eight Council members - to control the Nation's
entire government and only six boycotting Councilors to bring the Nation's
government to a halt. Keen's motion called for a lower house (tribal council)
apportioned by district population and an upper house (senate) apportioned by
one delegate per district. The move to two houses of government would
increase the total number of legislators from fifteen to thirty-three and reduce
the ratio of legislators to citizens from 1:12,000 to 1:5,500.67
Quoting James Madison's Federalist No. 51, Keen argued that a bicameral
legislature's dual legislative track structure and form of election as well as its
increased size would prevent a small bloc of united Council members from
controlling the levers of the Nation's government. A supporter of the motion
said the lower house could address local concerns while the upper house
would provide "balance" and "stability" by ensuring that the legislature did
not get bogged down in debates over local issues. Another argument raised
in favor of Keen's bicameral proposal was its consistency with the Nation's
bicameral system of government in the 1827 and 1839 constitutions.
In response, several delegates proffered a series of counterarguments
against the adoption of a bicameral legislature. Some feared that two houses
of government would double the potential for stonewalling and make it more
difficult for the Nation to reach consensus. Another delegate argued that,
unlike the Founding Fathers of the U.S. Government, who wanted to develop
a mechanism for distributing power among states of unequal population, the
Nation did not have a problem with regard to unequal power among its
districts. Several members of the Convention Commission reported that
bicameralism had been raised during public hearings but felt that such a
change would present too many practical difficulties.68 Commission members
said they were "stymied" in their attempt to figure out a way to implement a
66. See Champagne, supra note 4.
67. Keen's motion for a bicameral legislature is found in 2 CHEROKEE CONSTrruriON
CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 61, at 63-64 (transcript of Feb. 27, 1999).
68. Hannah and other Commissioners believed that a move to a bicameral legislature
"would require an absolute dismemberment of the powers of the Cherokee Nation to redistribute
among the two houses." Id. at 68.
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bicameral legislature without affecting other constitutional provisions.69 The
Nation's Chief Justice quickly and forcefully denounced the Commission's
concerns, describing it as "mindboggling" that the leaders at the Convention
couldn't figure out how to form a bicameral legislature.7 °
Surprisingly, the argument that appeared to seal victory for opponents of
a bicameral legislature was the simple one of cost. Numerous delegates felt
that the Nation's annual budget should be spent on delivering services to
Cherokee citizens rather than creating a bigger government. Although several
delegates said the issue was important enough to justify a fuller examination
of structure, powers, and cost, the delegation ultimately voted down the
proposal.
B. Judiciary
Much focus at the Convention was spent on restructuring the Nation's
judiciary. The provisions in the 1976 Constitution concerning the judiciary
had not kept up with the spectrum of civil jurisdiction powers increasingly
exercised by Indian nations. The corporate model of the constitution vested
the Nation's three-member Judicial Appeal Tribunal with powers only "to
hear and resolve any disagreements arising under any provisions of this
Constitution or any enactment of the Council." In addition to strengthening
the judiciary's powers, the delegates were concerned about its political
independence. Great concern was placed on preventing a reoccurrence of the
impeachments, standoffs, lockouts, dual court systems and other problems
between the judiciary and the other two branches that had taken place during
the crisis.
To strengthen the powers of the judiciary, the delegates agreed to a two-
tiered court system consisting of a Supreme Court (formerly the Judicial
Appeals Tribunal) and lower district courts. The proposed constitution vests
the Nation's district courts with original jurisdiction to hear and resolve
disputes arising under the laws or constitution of the Nation, whether criminal
or civil in nature.7' It vests the Supreme Court with powers of original
jurisdiction over all cases involving the Nation or its officials named as a
defendant and with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all district court
cases.72 To improve the scope and depth of decision making of the Supreme
69. Id. at 69.
70. Id. at 70.
71. PROPOSED CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLA. CONST. art. VIn, § 6.
72. PROPOSED CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
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Court, the proposed constitution raises the number of justices from three to
five.73
The delegates also took a series of steps to strengthen the judiciary's
independence while providing checks on the exercise of its powers. To
protect the Judiciary's independence from various interest groups, delegates
voted to have judges and justices appointed by the Principal Chief rather than
elected. Under the proposed constitution, judges and justices also serve
longer terms (ten years for Supreme Court justices) and cannot have their
salaries diminished during their terms. 74 To prevent court-stacking, the
proposed constitution staggers the terms of the judges and justices so they do
not overlap with the terms of the Principal Chief more than twice in any five
year period.
At the same time, the proposed constitution contains several checks. First,
it keeps judges and justices subject to removal by the Council for specified
causes. The most innovative check, however, is the proposed constitution's
Court on the Judiciary. After suffering through the recent impeachment of the
entire judiciary by the Principal Chief and Council, the delegates wanted to
preserve the judiciary's integrity without allowing it to police itself entirely.
Similar to the discipline-keeping role of European-style Constitutional Courts,
the Court on the Judiciary is a seven-member panel vested with powers of
suspension, sanction, discipline and recommendation of removal ofjudges and
justices.75 Borrowed from a similar body in the Oklahoma Constitution, the
Court is composed of two appointees from each of the Nation's three branches
of government, who collectively appoint a seventh. One of the two appointees
of each branch must be a member of the Cherokee Nation Bar Association and
the other a nonlawyer.76
73. PROPOSED CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLA. CONST. art. Vin, § 1. For discussion at
Convention of need for additional Justices, see 5 CHEROKEE CONSTITUTION CONVENTION
TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 61, at 80-81 (transcript of Mar. 2, 1999).
74. PROPOSED CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLA. CONST. art VIII, §§ 2, 6. For discussion at
Convention, see Cherokee Nation Constitution Convention, supra note 63 at 100.
75. PROPOSED CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 5. For discussion at
Convention, see 6 CHEROKEE CONSTITUTION CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 61, at 54-
61 (transcript of Mar. 3, 1999).
76. PROPOSED CHEROKEE NATION OF OKLAHOMA CONST. art. VIII, § 5. For discussion at
Convention, see 6 CHEROKEE CONSTITUTION CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 61, at 62-
64 (transcript of Mar. 3, 1999).
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C. Representation on Tribal Council for Off-Reservation Residents
Mandatory federal relocation programs, forced removals, a lack of well-
paying jobs on many reservation lands, and routine migration has left many
American Indian nations with high numbers of off-reservation citizens. The
situation is especially pronounced for American Indian nations lacking a
sufficient number of well-paying reservation-based jobs. With approximately
forty percent of its 200,000 citizens living off-reservation, the Cherokee
Nation is at the forefront of this trend of dispersed Indian citizenry.
The Nation's current 1976 Constitution does not provide for specific
representation on the Tribal Council for off-reservation residents. Instead,
off-reservation residents select a district or precinct within the Nation's
historical boundaries for purposes of registration and voting. Off-reservation
residents claim this has led many candidates to solicit their votes before
elections and ignore them afterwards.77
Gaining representation on the Council proved to be the foremost priority
of the fourteen Convention delegates residing off-reservation. Julia Coates
Foster, a Cherokee citizen living in New Mexico, organized a meeting of all
fourteen off-reservation delegates on the night before the Convention's first
day to develop a strategy for gaining representation. An initial step in the
strategy was to become better able to identify those delegates who were
players on both sides of the crisis troubles.78
On the Convention's second day, Foster introduced a motion requesting
representation for off-reservation residents. Foster's motion called for twenty
percent of Council seats to be reserved for representation of the Nation's off-
reservation residents. If off-reservation Cherokees were included as delegates
to the Convention, she asked, why shouldn't they have a seat at the legislative
table? Foster argued that representation would provide off-reservation
residents with the information necessary to advocate for Cherokee issues
against outside public and private interests. She also pointed to the need for
stronger bonds among Cherokee's diverse citizenry. "Our land base is
minimal ... but in some sense our Nation exists from coast to coast and
border to border because our Nation exists in our people, our citizens and our
citizens are everywhere. 79
77. Address by Martha Berry, supra note 2.
78. Interview with Julia Coates Foster, supra note 64.
79. See 2 CHEROKEE CONSTrrUTION CONVENTION TRANSCRIPrS, supra note 61, at 98-99
(transcript of Feb. 27, 1999). Another delegate expressed a similar opinion: "I would like to
think also that the Cherokee Nation is more than just its territory boundaries. I'd like to think
[Vol. 28
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol28/iss1/1
OVERCOMING THE POLITICS OF REFORM
Opposition by delegates residing within the reservation's boundaries was
swift. Delegate David Cornsilk reminded delegates that off-reservation
citizens were adequately represented in the Nation."° Contrasting Foster's
view of the Nation being made up of its citizens, wherever they were, Cornsilk
countered that the "Cherokee Nation is a real place, that it is here. That it is
within the exterior boundaries of the Cherokee Nation as described in our
treaties, and that the focus of the people who live outside the Cherokee Nation
should be to strengthen the Nation, the place here."'" Other delegates argued
that the Nation's current system of having off-reservation residents choose a
district within which to register and vote was sufficient. Couldn't a group of
off-reservation residents simply form an organization and agree to register in
the same district as a bloc? 2
The tide turned when a well-respected current Council member, Barbara
Starr-Scott, unexpectedly stood up in support of off-reservation representation
with the simple declaration that "[w]hen everybody represents you, nobody
represents you."8 3  The motion then became renamed the Starr-Scott
proposal.8 4 Eventually, the two sides reached a compromise calling for the
Council to be expanded from fifteen to seventeen members, with the
additional two at-large seats reserved specifically for representation of off-
reservation residents.
D. Blood Quantum Requirements for Candidates for Principal Chief
At the end of the Nineteenth Century, the U.S. Government terminated its
official recognition of the Nation's government. To transfer land out of the
Nation's ownership, the U.S. Government created the Dawes Commission to
create a list of individual Cherokees eligible to receive individual land
allotments. Under the Nation's current constitution, citizenship is granted to
any descendant by blood of a Cherokee originally listed on the Dawes
Commission Rolls. By 1999, the descendancy test, along with time and
intermarriage, had allowed the Nation to grow to over 200,000 citizens. These
same forces had also worked to greatly lower the Indian blood quantum of the
Nation. At the time of the Convention, approximately ninety percent of the
that the Cherokee Nation is people, wherever we are." Id. at 102 (testimony of Delegate
MacLemore).
80. See id. at 99-100 (testimony of Delegate Cornsilk).
81. Id. at 100.
82. See id. at 103-04 (testimony of Delegate Meredith).
83. See id. at 101 (testimony of Deborah Scott [sic]).
84. Address by Martha Berry, supra note 2.
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Nation was one-quarter Indian blood or less, with the most common degree of
blood quantum being one-sixteenth or one-thirty-second.85
The tension between full-blooded and lower-blooded Cherokees manifested
itself on the Convention's fifth and sixth day, when delegates introduced
motions to establish a minimum blood quantum requirement for candidates for
Principal Chief. The first motion was for candidates to be citizens by one-
sixteenth of greater blood quantum and be bilingual in Cherokee and English.
The motion was immediately and strongly opposed by several delegates. One,
referring to the low blood quanta of the Nation's citizenry argued:
If we put this kind of limitation on ourselves, we are simply saying
that we don't trust ourselves to lead our own Nation. We're trying
to say that the people, our own children, our own grandchildren, at
some point are not capable of leading this Nation, simply because
they have some federally imposed degree of Indian blood.86
A second delegate opposed the motion with a warning for the future:
We're saying that we are going to put a time and date on the
existence of the Cherokee Nation. If we put a grade of Indian
blood on it... we're saying that in a hundred years or two hundred
years, that we will cease to exist as a people, at least with a
leader.87
The motion was quickly voted down.88 The next day, however, the issue was
raised again, this time through a motion presented on behalf of a bloc of
nondelegates calling for a one-quarter blood quantum for candidates for
Principal Chief. 89 The sponsor based the motion on the "pride of not one day
seeing a blond-haired, blue-eyed Chief representing me."' Supporters of the
motion associated low blood quantum Cherokees with dominating the
Convention by talking in fast "legalese" that they couldn't understand.9 One
grounded his desire for a blood quantum requirement as a way to maintain the
85. 5 CHEROKEE CONSTTUTION CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 61, at 11 (transcript
of Mar. 2, 1999) (testimony of David Comsilk).
86. Id.
87. Id. (testimony of Delegate Bill Baker).
88. Id. at 12.
89. 6 CHEROKEE CONSTITUTION CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 61, at 33 (transcript
of Mar. 3, 1999).
90. Id. at 34.
91. See id. at 85 (testimony of Delegate Silversmith).
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"integrity of the Cherokee Nation."92 Another felt that a blood quantum
requirement for Chief would serve as an important symbol for Cherokee
children: ". . .1 would like for our Cherokee children, our dark-skinned
Cherokee children to able to look at their Chief and see someone like them.
I think that's essential for their self-esteem."93
In opposition, delegates argued along several lines: the blood quantum
requirement could not stand up against the test of time and the Nation's ever
decreasing native bloodlines;94 citizens' opportunities to run for office should
not be limited by their blood; those favoring higher blood quantum could
express their desire for such a candidate at the ballot box;95 blood quantum is
a nontraditional value introduced by the federal government and not an
appropriate criterion for determining the Nation's Chief;9 6 the Dawes
Commission made mistakes in its original blood quantum determinations,
therefore making it inherently inaccurate;97 and blood quantum is not a perfect
match for "Indianness."9' A final argument was that such a change would
92. Id. at 34 (testimony of Delegate Silversmith).
93. Id. at 36 (testimony of Delegate Hook).
94. See id. at 34 (testimony of Delegate Hembree) ("[L]et's make this decision based on
generations.").
95. Another delegate discussed the blood quantum requirement:
Placing a blood quantum may be something we desire, and it may be something
that we can show that desire by reflecting it at the ballot box by saying the
candidate who is 1/64 Cherokee, we may not want to split that person. But we
should not put in our constitution that we are going to discriminate on the basis
of blood quantum.
Id. at 33 (testimony of Delegate Haskins Jr.).
96. See id. at 35 (testimony of Delegate Masters).
[Bllood quantum by the way is not a traditional value. It was imposed on the
people by the government. It's a government designation, not a tribal designation
that we have had. There are many people who have bought into this government
designation that they can say what a Cherokee is by the surrender documents that
they have held on us. But this is not a traditional value.... [If we want a blood
quantum, we need to go back and reconsider, a Cherokee of the Cherokee Nation
must be a one-quarter blood according to BIA and state standards ... So what we
need to do if we want blood quantum, it needs to be in the membership category,
and we need to limit the Cherokee Nation to one-quarter blood or more, according
to government documents and government projects and government standards.
Id.
97. See id. at 36-37 (testimony of Delegates Clarke and Scott).
98. See id. at 37 (testimony of Delegate Hammons).
[W]hile it makes me proud to see a leader of my Nation that looks like an Indian,
I don't think that that ought to be the standard for whether or not they represent
me, ladies and gentlemen. Because, unfortunately, we've seen in the past few
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never be approved by Cherokee voters at a referendum.99
In the end, the delegates voted to reject a minimum blood quantum
requirement for candidates for Principal Chief.
IV. Ratification
Notwithstanding the scope of the Convention's work, there was no
guarantee that the Cherokee people would vote to ratify the proposed new
constitution. Indeed, the sweeping nature of the changes in the proposed
constitution posed a significant obstacle to ratification.
In the aftermath of the Convention, several high-ranking officials and
lawyers in the Nation's current administration felt the proposed constitution
contained "too much legislation. ' ' "° Citing the document's mandate of
attendance at Council meetings and the "unwieldy" language concerning
representation for off-reservation residents, they expressed concern that the
proposed constitution's specificity would work to constrain effective
government action.'' These arguments were usually wrapped up in a larger
preference for limited, framework-based constitutions that serve primarily to
outline institutional arrangements.'02
In response, other delegates defended the proposed constitution's
"legislation" as necessary. Foster said there was "much legislation in the
document because it was written during a crisis. The more words, the hotter
the issue."'0 3 Indeed, transcripts from the convention reveal a frustration with
the Nation's minimalist, framework-oriented constitution. Simply charging
the Council to implement legislation, some delegates argued, was not
years that you can look like a Cherokee, and you can talk like a Cherokee and not
care about the Cherokee people.
Id.
99. See id. at 33 (testimony of Delegate Robinson).
100. Interview with David Mullon, Cherokee Associate General Counsel, and Chad Smith,
Principal Chief, in Tahlequah, Okla. (June 23, 2000).
101. Cherokee Nation Associate General Counsel David Mullon: "The more detailed a
constitution is the more of an imposition you are on the future." Interview with David Mullon,
supra note 100. One delegate from the Byrd administration argues that the current
administration opposes the constitution's detailed nature "because it constrains them."
Interview with Charles Gourd, supra note 33.
102. See 3 CHEROKEE CONSTITUTION CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS, supra note 61, at 32, 89
(transcript of Feb. 28, 1999); see also 4 CHEROKEE CONSTrrUTION CONVENTION TRANSCRIPTS,
supra note 61, at 33 (transcript of Mar. 1, 1999) (testimony of Delegate Chad Smith).
103. Interview with Julia Coates Foster, supra note 64.
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sufficient when the Council had not acted in the past.t n
In addition to debates over constitutional "legislation," a second concern
revolved around the decision of the Commission and Convention delegates to
replace the current constitution in a wholesale manner, rather than by a series
of amendments. David Mullon, former general counsel for the Nation,
worried that the Commission's introduction of a replacement constitution
would present a "big target" for opposition, where individual opposition to a
single proposed provision might lead to a vote against the constitution as a
whole." Others, including a Supreme Court Justice, feared that the wholesale
replacement of the Nation's current constitution would lead to the loss of the
precedential value of the Nation's entire body of case law.
The Commission defended its decision as necessary, arguing that the sheer
amount of recommended changes brought forth by Cherokee citizens during
the public hearings and comment period precluded revising the current
constitution by amendment. Citing the Nation's need for the significant
amount of changes in the proposed constitution, Hannah expressed concern
about individuals wanting to "throw the baby out with the bathwash." ' 6
Notwithstanding these points of disagreement, reform leaders on both sides
of the aisle affirmed the legitimacy of the Nation's constitutional revision
process and the substance of the proposed constitution. Even Swimmer, the
primary author of the current constitution, agreed at the time that "the
constitution convention and the product they developed seems to be pretty
well accepted by most people."'0 7
In fact, the most significant obstacle to ratification did not result from
104. The debate in some sense mirrors that between the "framework-oriented" U.S. national
constitution and many more detailed state constitutions that contain legislation and policy.
Some state constitutional scholars believe this divergence may be explained in part by the fact
that the national constitution contemplated that additional details and policies would be filled
in by its express delegation of powers to individual state constitutions. See G. ALAN TARR,
UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 10 (1998). The drafters of state constitutions, on the
other hand, could not rely on a separate document or government body to fill in ambiguous
mandates. The push by delegates to hold the Nation's government accountable through detailed
constitutional legislation may be explained in part by similar reasoning. Tribal citizens, lacking
the U.S. Government's abundance of federal regulations and long history of federal court
decisions, have less avenues for "lawmaking" than states and therefore may look to a
constitution as their sole guarantee of protection.
105. "An organic document presents a very big target. People with nothing in common
except that they're against the document." Interview with David Mullon, supra note 100.
106. Interview with Jay Hannah, Member, Cherokee Nation Constitution Commission, in
Tahlequah, Okla. (Sept. 2, 2000).
107. Interview with Ross Swimmer, supra note 14.
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internal debates within the Nation. Rather, a referendum vote to approve the
Convention's proposed constitution was delayed for over four years because
of the Nation's interactions with the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The delay
stemmed from Article XV, Section 10 of the 1976 Constitution, which
included language requiring that any amendment or new constitution be
approved by the "President of the United States or his authorized
representative."' 8  Because the Cherokee Nation did not organize its
government pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act, it was not required by
U.S. law to obtain federal approval for new and amended constitutions.
Swimmer said he included the language as a defensive measure to ensure the
recognition of the Nation's 1976 constitution by the U.S. Government.0 9
Following the constitution's self-imposed requirement, the Commission
sought BIA approval of the proposed constitution adopted by delegates to the
Convention. After not hearing from the Bureau for several months, the
Commission began to lobby the Bureau with calls and letters from September
through December 1999.10 After nine months of review by two separate field
offices, the Solicitor's office, and several internal levels in the Bureau's
Washington central office, the Bureau finally decided on December 14, 1999,
not to approve the Convention's proposed constitution."' In a lengthy
disapproval letter to the Nation, the Bureau delivered a series of mandated and
recommended changes to specific articles of the proposed constitution.
Instead of proceeding with a referendum without the Bureau's blessing, the
Commission decided not to spend $350,000 on a special election on the
proposed constitution only to be told subsequently by the U.S. Government
that it is null and void. At least one member of the Commission feared that
governing under a constitution not recognized by the U.S. Government would
lead the BIA to cease its recognition of Council actions and jeopardize the
108. CHEROKEE NATION OFOKLA. CONST. art. XV, § 7 (1976).
109. Swimmer commented regarding the 1976 Constitution:
We were trying to adopt a constitution in place of the 1906 Act [terminating the
Nation] and we felt that if we didn't have the federal imprimatur on this
constitution that the BIA could come back and say well you're violating the '06'
Act. You're [sic] constitution doesn't mean anything. By getting the signature of
the Secretary of Interior on our constitution, it meant to us that we would have to
recognize this as the governing document of our tribe.
Interview with Ross Swimmer, supra note 14.
110. Hannah began attempting to contact the Bureau "on my speed dial every day."
Interview with Jay Hannah, supra note 37.




OVERCOMING THE POLITICS OF REFORM
Nation's operation of its federally funded government programs." 2 Instead,
the Nation's Tribal Council responded to the Bureau's decision on February
26, 2000, by proposing a single amendment to the 1976 Constitution striking
the requirement to obtain U.S. Government approval." 3
Finally, in April 2002, after a change in administration at the Bureau and
much behind-the-scenes discussions, the Department of Interior approved the
Council's proposed amendment removing the need for approval of
constitutional amendments by the U.S. Government. With the legal path clear,
Cherokee citizens voted on May 24, 2003, to strike the 1976 Constitution's
requirement of U.S. Governmental approval of all constitutional amendments.
A final referendum on the constitution adopted by Convention delegates in
1999 was scheduled for July 26, 2003.
In preparation for the final vote, the Commission conducted a public
education initiative unprecedented in Indian Country. The Commission
inserted 100,000 copies of a fourteen page Constitution Education Tabloid
into the tribal newspaper and mailed an additional 26,000 copies to all
Cherokee registered voters.' 1 4 The Commission also conducted forty-one
Constitution Education forums throughout the Nation and the United States,
including Texas, California and Kansas, where there were high concentrations
of Cherokee citizens. The schedule for the education forums were advertised
by 500 posters printed and posted throughout the Cherokee Nation, direct
mailings of 26,000 oversized "post cards" to registered voters, and press
releases to over forty newspapers. The Commission also made ample use of
the Nation's website to disseminate critical information regarding the
referendum. "5
Finally, on July 26, 2003, more than four years after the conclusion of the
Convention, the Cherokee citizens voted to approve a new constitution
112. A precedent for such action occurred in the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma, another
nation with a constitution requiring approval by the U.S. Government.
113. Open Letter from Convention Chairman Jay Hannah to Convention Delegates (Feb. 15,
2000), available at http://www.cherokee.org/TribalGovernment/CCCArchivePage.asp?ID=2-
l5JayLetter (last visited Sept. 22, 1003).
114. The tabloid was also posted on the Nation's website in a printable format. Interview
with Jay Hannah, Chairman, Cherokee Nation Constitution Convention, in Tahlequah, Okla.
(Aug. 6, 2003).
115. The Cherokee Nation website contained a PDF version of the Education Tabloid, a
web-cast of one of the forums, a schedule of forums, press releases, and general contact
information. A weekly reminder e-mail of Constitution Education Forums was sent to over
100,000 e-newsletter subscribers. Id.
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replacing the Nation's current 1976 constitution.'1 6  Ironically, notwith-
standing the vote of the Cherokee people and the election's certification by the
Cherokee Nation Election Commission, as of the date of this writing
implementation of the new constitution has been delayed indefinitely. The
delay stems from the Bureau of Indian Affairs' recent decision to review the
results of the May 24, 2003, Cherokee election removing the requirement of
presidential approval of any amendment or new constitution. 117
Concluding Thoughts
It is difficult to draw conclusions from the experiences of one nation.
However, some tentative lessons can be drawn from the Nation's story.
First, the Nation's story is important because it demonstrates the power of
institutions to catalyze and legitimize reform processes. On a first cut, the
provision in Article XV, Section 10 of the Nation's current constitution
requiring periodic referenda for the calling of a constitutional convention
allowed for the crucial introduction of citizen voices demanding change."'
To fulfill the will of the Cherokee voters, however, the Nation still had to
develop a reform process viewed as legitimate and independent from the
incumbent government. Somewhat counterintuitively, the Nation created an
independent Constitution Commission by including appointees from all three
116. The final vote was 3622 in favor and 3059 against. CERTIFICATION OF CHEROKEE
NATION ELECTION COMMISSION (Aug. 7, 2003).
117. As discussed earlier, the BIA consented in an April 2002 letter to the removal of the
U.S. Government from the Nation's constitutional review process. However, the letter left open
the possibility of Bureau review under a separate federal act, the Principal Chiefs Act. In
August 2003, several losing candidates in the May 24, 2003, general election wrote a letter to
the Bureau of Indian Affairs claiming election irregularities and the disenfranchisement of
Cherokee freedmen in both the May 24 general election and the July 26 runoff election. The
BIA, claiming authority under the Principal Chiefs Act, announced that it would review the
results of the May 24, 2003, election (the same election in which Cherokee voters approved an
amendment to the 1976 Constitution removing the requirement for presidential approval of any
amendment or new constitution). Although the BIA subsequently has upheld the re-election of
Principal Chief Chad Smith, it has not yet stated its position concerning the portion of the May
24 general election in which citizens voted to amend the 1976 Constitution by removing the
requirement of presidential approval.
118. Although a strong initial catalyst, the power of such a periodic referendum to trigger
reform is not absolute. As one scholar of state constitutional revision has noted, periodic
referenda may be scheduled at inopportune times, when other priorities crowd out concerns for
constitutional reform. G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutional Reform and Its Implications for Tribal
Constitutionalism: Paper Presented at Tribes Moving Forward: Engaging in the Process of
Constitutional and Governmental Reform (Apr. 3, 2001) (copy on file with author).
[Vol. 28
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol28/iss1/1
OVERCOMING THE POLITICS OF REFORM
branches of government. This allowed incumbent officeholders the comfort
of having representation on the Commission while, at the same time,
preventing any single government body from controlling it. The Nation then
lent teeth to the Commission's independence by granting the Commission
exclusive authority over the reform process and investing it with the power to
place its proposed reforms directly on a referendum without the requirement
of initial approval by any branch of government.
Together, the constitutional language for the "automatic referendum" every
twenty years and the independent nature of the Commission allowed the
Nation to begin a legitimate process of reform at a time of widespread mistrust
and heightened instability. The Commission's method of engaging public
input and support for its work, as well as its inclusive method for choosing
Convention delegates, added the crucial final steps. Cumulatively, they led
to the creation of a legitimate and accepted forum - the Convention -
within which to debate complex and often divisive issues of governance.
Second, the substance of the Convention debates themselves is enlightening
for revealing how the Nation pursued reform in two distinct areas. The Nation
desired not only to create stronger and more accountable governmental
institutions (e.g., debates over bicameralism, separation of powers, and
judicial reform), but also to address primary questions of citizenship and
national identity (e.g., representation for off-representation residents and
blood quantum requirements for citizens and candidates for Principal Chief).
This dual track nature of constitutional reform most likely will resemble the
reform processes of other American Indian nations as they continue to assume
governmental responsibilities from the U.S. Government, see their populations
geographically and demographically diversify, and face cultural, political and
economic pressures to confront issues of citizenship.
For these reasons, analyzing how the Commission and the Convention
delegates resolved such issues is relevant to a larger number of American
Indian nations. Procedurally, the Commission included delegates from a wide
cross-section of political and demographic stripes. The adoption of Roberts'
Rules of Order then allowed all for the input of all seventy-nine delegates.
While this led to instances of intense debate, it also vested the delegates'
decisions with legitimacy. For especially controversial or technically complex
proposed amendments, the Convention formed caucuses to hammer out
agreements. Together, these procedural devices helped the Nation create a
sovereign arena within which to plan the government of its future.
A broader observation from the convention concerns the method by which
delegates addressed substantive constitutional concerns. Invariably, delegates
moved from discussions of immediate and pressing concerns to more general
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and deeper issues of governance. The demands by off-reservation residents
for political representation, for example, evolved into debates over whether
Cherokees were "members of a tribe" or "citizens of a nation." Calls for
blood quantum requirements for the Principal Chief led to deeper questions
of citizenship and the definition of who is a Cherokee. Ultimately, the
delegates didn't resolve these issues at the Convention. Nonetheless, this
pattern of discussion exemplifies how preliminary discussions of concrete
problems of governance may be necessary lead-ins to reaching larger
questions of governmental transformation and national identity." 9
To the extent that the Cherokee Nation's story is representative, American
Indian nations are engaged in a process of creating more effective and
legitimate constitutions. However, instead of re-envisioning their governing
institutions or refashioning their national identities out of whole cloth, they
are grounding their discussions of reform against the backdrop of tangible
concerns associated with day-to-day government operations. In the end, the
Nation's story demonstrates how a well-designed, inclusive, and politically
independent constitutional reform process can help achieve the monumental
task of transforming such concerns into the development of new constitutions
and governing institutions.
119. At the same time, full-fledged debates over novel ideas allowing for the expanding
exercise of sovereignty or the restructuring of government were often cut short. Arguments for
bicameralism, additional justices, sending a delegate to Congress, and representation for off-
reservation residents, for example, were all initially or ultimately met by arguments of cost. In
other instances, especially early in the convention, expansive ideas for restructuring government
were also objected to on the basis that they would not receive Bureau approval, a fear later born
out in actuality.
[Vol. 28
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol28/iss1/1
